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Abstract 
 
We compare the treatment of Colombia in large cross-country conflict 
datasets with the information of the detailed micro dataset of Restrepo, 
Spagat and Vargas (2003).  We find a general tendency of the big datasets to 
underestimate the magnitude of the Colombian conflict and to 
mischaracterize its dynamics.  We suggest that conflict researchers should 
prioritize the construction of more micro datasets that will facilitate detailed 
studies of conflict intensity and its dynamics. 
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Introduction 
 
The development of big cross-country conflict datasets has been vital for the advance of 
conflict studies, particularly for the influential literature based on empirical analysis of 
civil conflicts.  Pioneering works in this field include the Correlates of War project 
(hereafter COW; Small and Singer, 1982), the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP; 
Wallensteen and Axell, 1993) and the Civil War Termination project (CWT; Licklider, 
1995).   
 Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2003) introduced an entirely different approach to 
the study of civil conflict, developing a general methodology for the in-depth 
measurement of conflict activity in a single conflict.  Restrepo et al. (2003) then applied 
this approach to construct a detailed, micro-level dataset for Colombia, hereafter RSV.  
Restrepo et al. (2003) and Restrepo and Spagat (2004) analyze the dataset so that its 
general contours are now clear.  Therefore, the time is ripe to compare RSV with the 
Colombia components of the large cross-country datasets.   
 This paper will serve two main purposes.  First, we will evaluate the killing 
figures for Colombia used in the cross-country datasets by comparing them with those in 
RSV.  Based on our comparisons, the researchers who maintain these databases may wish 
to revise their Colombia figures in future releases of their data.  We show below that 
there has been a general tendency to underestimate the magnitude of the Colombian 
conflict, particularly for the datasets that provide yearly killing rates.  Therefore, some 
upward adjustments are probably necessary, as long as these changes are consistent with 
the methodology these projects are applying to other conflicts.  Second, we will provide a 
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general quality check on the cross-country datasets.  It would be rather difficult and 
expensive for a cross-country dataset to treat every single country at the level of detail 
and with the degree of care that RSV applies to Colombia.  Still, by comparing the big 
datasets with each other and with RSV at their main point of intersection we are 
evaluating quality.  Admittedly, it is a sample of one but it is the only possible sample at 
the moment, although we hope that more micro-level datasets on conflict will become 
available in the future to enable further investigations into the quality of cross-country 
conflict data. 
 
The data 
The data on Colombia 
RSV is the first time-series dataset for the Colombian civil war that is detailed (close to 
21,000 events), high-frequency and long.  It allows analysis of the actions of all 
participants in the Colombian conflict over more than 16 years.  The methodology it 
employs for measuring conflict activity is based on events as the unit of data inclusion 
and analysis.  For each event the database records a set of characteristics: date; 
geographical location; whether or not there was a clash; the groups involved; whether or 
not there was an attack; the type of attack; the group(s) responsible; killings; and 
injuries.1 In this way, the researcher can gauge not only the dynamics of the conflict 
across space and on time, but also the intensity of various conflict activities. 
 We summarize here the main characteristics of the dataset and refer the reader to 
Restrepo et al. (2003) for details.  The dataset is built using events listed in the annexes to 
the periodicals Justicia y Paz and Noche y Niebla published quarterly by the Colombian 
                                                 
1 Clashes require fighting between at least two groups while attacks are uncontested events. 
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NGO'S CINEP and the Comisión Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz (hereafter, 
CINEP).  Most of the event information comes from primary sources.  CINEP uses this 
information in its reports, focusing on the measurement of human rights violations, 
violations to international humanitarian law and political violence, connected or not with 
the conflict.  RSV, on the other hand, focuses on civil war dynamics.  Therefore, 
CINEP’s database organization and statistical analysis are entirely inappropriate for its 
purposes.  Fortunately, the raw information of CINEP is so extensive that RSV 
researchers are able to distil from it just its war-relevant components.  Working from the 
detailed list of events published in the annexes to the reports, RSV researchers identify 
and code events following their own criteria designed to include all conflict events and 
only those events. 
 In the original dataset and in quarterly updates the RSV team follows a stringent 
quality control regime in cleaning the data that proceeds in four stages, covering both 
event inclusion and the coding of events.  First, they randomly sample a large number of 
events and check against the CINEP source that they are properly included and coded.  
Second, they randomly sample events, look up these events in press archives and again 
verify their inclusion and coding.  This is a test both of the transfer of information from 
the CINEP source to RSV and of the quality of the CINEP raw information itself, which 
turns out to be high.  Third, they find all the major events in the dataset and carefully 
investigate each one in the press record.  Finally, they compare lists of significant events 
from other sources, such as Human Rights Watch and Colombian government reports, 
with RSV, occasionally adding events after thoroughly investigating them themselves.   
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International cross-sectional datasets 
Table I lists the main relevant datasets, summarizes their nature and relates them to 
Colombia.  This is not an exhaustive survey like the one provided in Eck (2003).  Rather, 
we select influential datasets that are relatively accessible, focus on intra-state rather than 
inter-state conflict and use quantitative fatality thresholds.2  
The object of study varies across the datasets both in terminology and content.  
COW, CWT, and datasets by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
all focus on the category “civil war”.  There is some variation in the definition of civil 
war across these datasets but at the intersection of the qualitative components of these 
definitions there are the following requirements: civil wars occur within the recognized 
boundaries of a state; the state fights against organized groups striving for political 
power; the rebels effectively challenge the sovereignty of the state in some regions; 
animosity between parties of the conflict together with the fact that peace would require 
living together affects the type of peace settlement that can be reached.  It is quite clear 
that the Colombian conflict satisfies these criteria.3  All of the databases also define 
violence thresholds that a conflict must cross if it is to be included (Table I).  RSV 
indicates that all these thresholds are comfortably satisfied for Colombia from 1988 to the 
present.4 
                                                 
2 The IISS dataset is an exceptional case that does not employ quantitative violence thresholds but we list it 
anyway since it provides a time series for its intensity measure.   
3 Rabasa and Chalk (2001) gives a good overview of the Colombian conflict. 
4 Nevertheless, many analysts of the Colombian conflict insist that, although it is a very serious affair, the 
conflict should not be described as a civil war.  Posada (2001), for example, stresses that the illegal armed 
groups in Colombia enjoy very little popular support.  In his view, civil war terminology endows these 
violent actors with undeserved legitimacy, constantly encouraging the notion that the State should negotiate 
with them and address their concerns.  In this view, conflicts should be classified as civil wars only when 
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 Beyond the question of civil war, there is considerable variety among cross-
country datasets, beginning with the range of terminology and definitions of the object of 
study (Table I).  Some databases are not regularly updated since they were created for 
specific projects that have already been completed.  Other databases are updated 
regularly.  Some datasets include time series on killing rates while others just give 
aggregate numbers or even omit conflict intensity numbers entirely.  Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) use intensity as a screen for dataset inclusion but do not include intensity 
information in their dataset. 
                                                                                                                                                 
insurgents enjoy substantial civilian support.  Such arguments are alien to Table I so we do not pursue them 
further here, although perhaps the quantitative civil war literature should take account of them. 
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Table I.  Treatment of the Colombian conflict in Cross-country Datasets 
Dataset Source Type of Event (a) Violence threshold
Time 
Series
Start date    
(b)
Civil War Termination 
(CWT) Licklider (1995) Civil War No 1978
Correlates of War 
(COW) - Intrastate 
War
Sarkees (2000) Civil War No 1984
Doyle and Sambanis Doyle and Sambanis (2000) Civil war 1000 battle-related fatalities per year No 1978
Fearon and Laitin Fearon and Laitin (2002) Civil War
The conflict killed or has killed as least 1000 over its course, 
with a yearly average of at least 100. At least 100 of the 
dead are on the side of the government (including civilians).
Yes 1963
International Institute 
for Strategic Studies 
(IISS)
IISS (2004) Internal Armed Conflict 0
Yes    
(c) 1963
Interdisciplinary 
Research Programme 
on Causes of Human 
Rights Violations 
(PIOOM)
Jongman (2002) Conflict
1) high-intensity conflict: more than 1000 conflict-related 
fatalities per year
2) low-intensity conflicts: between 100-1000 fatalities per 
year
3) violent political conflict: less than 100 deaths per year
No 1964
Project Ploughshares
Project 
Ploughshares 
(2004)
Armed Conflict 1000 battle-related fatalities per year Yes    (d) 1964
Stockholm 
International Peace 
Research Institute 
(SIPRI)
SIPRI (2004) Major Armed Conflict 1,000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year
Yes    
(e) 1978
State Failure Task 
Force (SFTF)
Marshall et al. 
(2002)
Revolutionary 
War An average of 100 fatalities per year Yes    1984
Third-Party 
Intervention (TPI) Regan (2002)
Ideological Civil 
Conflict 200 fatalities in total No 1984
Uppsala Conflict Data 
Project (UCDP), 
Uppsala University 
and International 
Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO); 
Uppsala/PRIO
Eriksson (2004) Armed Conflict Yes 1965
Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) UCDP (2004) Armed Conflict Yes 1965
World Military and 
social Expenditures 
(WMSE)
Sivard (1991) War 1000 battle related fatalities per year No 1986
(a) This column gives the terminology used in each dataset
(b) Starting year of the current conflict according to each dataset.  They all consider the conflict as ongoing at the moment of their last update.
(c) Time series only from year 2000
(d) Time series only from year 1998
(e) Time series only from year 1997
1,000 battle-related fatalities per year. The weaker side must 
impose yearly? casualties on its opponent of at least 5% of 
its own
1) Minor Armed Conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per 
year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the 
course of the conflict
2) Intermediate Armed Conflict: At least 25 battle-related 
deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 
deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year
3) War: At least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year
 
 
Inspection of the treatment of Colombia in the datasets suggests significant variation in 
their quality.  For example, COW lists the Colombia conflict as one between the State, 
M19 and drug lords, that is, it lists as the only active guerrilla group a rather small and 
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urban organization that demobilised in 1989 and became a political group after a peace 
agreement with the government.  At the same time it ignores both what is arguably the 
largest active guerrilla group in the world by the estimated number combatants (the 
Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia: FARC in its Spanish acronym) and the large 
right-wing illegal paramilitaries.  Generally the datasets do not attempt to build time 
series on killings and the few exceptions give quite wide ranges (Table II).  When there 
are no underlying time series we find it difficult to place great confidence in aggregate 
numbers.  The summary numbers that appear in most datasets are poorly documented but 
seem to trace back to COW with corrections, expansions and updates in accordance with 
the specific aims of various research projects.  COW deserves great recognition for its 
ground-breaking nature but it has serious shortcomings.5  Notably, COW’s defining 
quantitative threshold for coding conflict episodes, 1,000 battle-related fatalities per year, 
presumes the existence of an annual time series.  Yet the dataset shows no time series on 
intensity for any countries and a careful inspection of the most complete methodological 
account of the project (Small and Singer, 1982) suggests that there probably never were 
time series and that the annual threshold tests were performed by averaging aggregate 
casualty figures taken from bibliographical sources.  In fact, before the 1990s only the 
State Failure Task Force (SFTF; Marshal et al., 2002), Uppsala/PRIO and UCDP datasets 
provide annual conflict intensity time series.6  The former gives a discrete intensity index 
that varies from 0 (less than 100 fatalities per year) to 4 (more than 10,000 per year) with 
                                                 
5 See Sambanis (2001) for a detailed discussion of COW and its problems. 
6 The UCDP of Uppsala University has been collecting data on armed conflicts since the late 1980s.  It has 
recently begun collaboration with the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and it has 
expanded its database to cover the post World War II period (Gleditsch et al., 2002), producing what we 
call the Uppsala/PRIO dataset.  The UCDP further expanded their coverage by adding new variables and 
released a searchable web-based dataset on armed conflicts (UCDP, 2004) that we call in our tables UCDP. 
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very wide ranges in between.  Uppsala/PRIO, similarly, provides an index that goes from 
1 (at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 over the course of the 
conflict) to 3 (at least 1,000 per year), and UCDP offers a narrower range of actual 
figures for battle-related fatalities beginning in 1989.7 
  
Comparing numbers 
Table II compares RSV with the data from the cross-country datasets that provide time 
series on conflict-related killing.  Some of the datasets give ranges of figures so that these 
comparisons are sometimes ambiguous.  Nevertheless, half the estimates in the table are 
unambiguous underestimates compared to RSV.  The degree of underestimation varies 
widely and is often very high.  For example, the mean of the range for UCDP never 
exceeds 2/3 of the RSV figures, is less than half of RSV’s figure in most years and is less 
than 1/3 of RSV’s figure in 2002.  The SFTF dataset in 1999 accounts for the only clear 
overestimate in Table II.  The numbers in this dataset jump around erratically between 
1996 and 2001 while the conflict was intensifying continuously, raising the possibility 
that the number for 1999 is simply an error.  Even when the figures in Table II are 
compatible with RSV’s the ranges are very wide.  The general conclusion we draw from 
Table II is that the big datasets are underestimating the magnitude of the Colombian 
conflict.  We are very confident in this finding because in assembling and maintaining the 
dataset on Colombia, the RSV team focuses on clear conflict-related activities, excluding, 
for example, political assassinations.  These crimes might be related to the conflict, but 
are often perpetrated by common criminals and associated with corruption and personal 
                                                 
7 Despite their similar approaches SFTF and Uppsala/PRIO-UCDP treat Colombia very differently.  
SFTF’s dataset inclusion criterion is less strict but, nevertheless, codes no conflict between 1960 and 1984 
while Uppsala/PRIO and UCDP date the start of the current conflict as 1965. 
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vendettas.  Thus, it is unlikely that RSV overestimates the intensity of the Colombian 
conflict so the big datasets must be underestimating it. 
 
Table II.  Total annual deaths when time series are available 
year RSV IISS Ploughshares SIPRI SFTF Uppsala/PRIO UCDP
1988 1859 1000 - 5000 25 - 1000
1989 1236 1000 - 5000 1000 + 152 - 732
1990 1820 1000 - 5000 1000 + 395 - 1229
1991 1860 1000 - 5000 25 - 1000 578 - 1364
1992 2036 1000 - 5000 1000 + 541 - 1478
1993 1560 1000 - 5000 1000 + 187 - 1331
1994 1375 1000 - 5000 25 - 1000 333 - 1243
1995 1330 1000 - 5000 25 - 1000 324 - 1105
1996 1582 100 - 1000 25 - 1000 817 - 1300
1997 1741 500 - 1000 1000 - 5000 25 - 1000 467 - 1703
1998 2417 2000 - 4000 1000 - 1500 1000 - 5000 1000 + 939 - 1138
1999 2710 2000 - 3000 1000 + 10000 + 1000 + 827 - 1837
2000 3101 3000 - 1200 1000 + 1000 - 5000 1000 + 938 - 1153
2001 3245 3000 - 2500 + 2000 - 3000 100 - 1000 1000 + 883 - 1362
2002 4038 3000 - 3500 1500 + 1000 + 972 - 1309
figure underestimated
figure overestimated  
 
SFTF, Uppsala/PRIO and UCDP classify conflicts into several intensity categories 
(Tables I & II).  SFTF usually chooses the correct band, given RSV’s figures, but their 
bands are very wide.  Uppsala/PRIO has very wide bands and often chooses a lower 
intensity category than RSV’s numbers suggest would be correct.  UCDP provides two 
separate annual intensity measures.  The first is a classification into the same categories 
as in Uppsala/PRIO.8  The second are tighter estimates of annual killings which are 
systematically below RSV’s figures. 
 Figures 1, 2 and 3 graph RSV’s numbers against those of SFTF, Uppsala/PRIO 
and UCDP. The shaded part of figures 1 and 2 represent the ranges on SFTF and 
Uppsala/PRIO respectively and the dotted lines of figure 3 that of UCDP. One of the 
                                                 
8 We do not include these classifications in Table II because they are identical to those of Uppsala/PRIO 
except for 1989.  Since the Uppsala team participated in both of these datasets we think that the 1989 figure 
might have been an error. 
 10
main points of Restrepo et al. (2003) was that there was a major upsurge in the conflict 
between 1996 and 2002.  None of the other datasets capture this important fact.  SFTF 
would suggest a huge decline in conflict intensity.  The Uppsala/PRIO numbers do 
suggest an upsurge for 1994-2002 but its classifications between 1988 and 1994 fluctuate 
so much that one cannot, on their basis, develop much confidence that the conflict really 
was intensifying during 1994-2002.  The UCDP range is essentially flat during the 
upsurge.  Moreover, the distance between UCDP’s upper and lower ranges narrows 
during the upsurge period, suggesting increasing confidence in this flat pattern.   
 
Figure 1.  RSV vs.  SFTF 
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Figure 2.  RSV vs.  Uppsala/PRIO 
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Figure 3.  RSV vs.  UCDP 
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In Table III we compare RSV’s numbers with those in all the cross-country datasets 
presented in Table I.  Since the different datasets cover different years in the conflict we 
compute annual average killing rates in each case.  Eight of the thirteen datasets with 
numbers underestimate the killing rate while three datasets give overestimates and the 
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remaining two offer ranges that include RSV’s number.  COW and COW2 are very close 
to RSV’s figure.9 
 
Table III.  Annual averages for killing rates 
Dataset (1) (2) (3)
RSV 1988 - 2002 31,910 2,127
CWT 1978 - 1991 15,849 1,132
COW 1984 - 1992 22,000 2,444
COW2 1984 - 1997 31,000 2,214
Doyle and Sambanis 1978 - 1992 22,000 1,467
IISS 1963 - 2002 56,000 1,400
PIOOM 1964 - 2001 50,000 - 300,000 1,316 - 7,895
Ploughshares 1964 - 2002 50,000 1,282
SIPRI 1964 - 2002 41,000 1,051
SFTF 1984 - 2001 22,500 - 65,000 1,250 - 3,611
TPI 1984 - 1999 11,000 688
Uppsala/PRIO 1965 - 2002 9,725 - 23,375 256 - 615
UCDP 1989 - 2002 8,353 - 18,284 597 - 1,306
WMSE 1986 - 1990 22,000 4,400
(1) Years of the Colombian conflict covered in each dataset.
(2) Total number of deaths during the period reported in (1)
(3) Annual average number of deaths during the period reported in (1) 
underestimated
overestimated
Colours compare the annual average of each dataset with the 
figure for RSV  
 
Conflict intensity varies from year to year and the years of coverage of the various 
datasets vary as well.  Therefore, the comparisons of Table III are potentially misleading.  
We address this issue by presenting in Table IV average death tolls for each dataset for 
the years of overlap with the RSV data and compare those figures with the RSV average 
death toll for these overlap years.10  The results turn out to be identical with those of table 
III.  We can, therefore, be confident about the relationship between the figures in each 
dataset and the RSV dataset. 
 
                                                 
9 COW2 is the 1997 update of the original COW dataset (Sarkees, 2000). 
10 Note that the figures for column 3 in Table III often coincide with those of column 3 in Table IV.  This 
happens either when a dataset does not provide a time series or when years covered by a time series are 
contained in the years covered in RSV.   
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Table IV.  Annual averages for killing rates in overlap years 
Dataset (1) (2) (3)
RSV 1988 - 2002 2,127 2,127
CWT 1988 - 1991 1,694 1,132
COW 1988 - 1992 1,762 2,444
COW2 1988 - 1997 1,640 2,214
Doyle and Sambanis 1988 - 1992 1,762 1,467
IISS 1988 - 2002 2,127 1,400
PIOOM 1988 - 2001 1,991 1,316 - 7,895
Ploughshares 1988 - 2002 2,127 1,282
SIPRI 1988 - 2002 2,127 1,051
State Failure 1988 - 2001 1,991 1,178 - 3,167
TPI 1988 - 1999 1,694 688
Uppsala/PRIO 1988 - 2002 2,127 246 - 605
UCDP 1989 - 2002 2,147 597 - 1,306
WMSE 1988 - 1990 1,638 4,400
(1) Overlap years between RSV and the other datasets
(2) Annual average for RSV during overlap years.
(3) Annual average for each dataset
underestimated
overestimated
Colours compare the figure with the annual average of 
RSV during overlap years  
 
Conclusion 
We have produced a snapshot of the world of cross-country conflict datasets.  Our 
analysis suggests that these datasets systematically underestimate the magnitude of the 
Colombian conflict and miss the significant upsurge in activity between 1996 and 2002.   
Cross-country datasets have been instrumental in expanding our understanding of 
civil wars.11  Econometric and statistical analyses of these datasets have generated much 
stimulating insight and debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002).  Generally these econometric studies of civil wars do not 
fall afoul of our critique, as they have avoided analyzing both conflict intensities and 
their dynamics.  Instead, they have simply used information on whether or not countries 
are at war at particular points in time.  In fact, this focus is sensible given the limitations 
of the cross-country datasets highlighted in our paper.   
                                                 
11 These insights are summarised in World Bank (2003) and Fitzgerald and Stewart (2000). 
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We believe that significant further progress in civil war research will require 
improvements and extensions of existing datasets and the development of new ones so 
that investigators can open up the black box of conflict intensity and its dynamics.  The 
key to this research programme is the construction of more micro datasets similar to 
RSV.  This will be our main priority in the future and we hope that other conflict 
researchers will join us in this endeavour. 
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